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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Conflicting Approaches to the Scope of Mandatory
Bargaining in Public University Faculty Employment:
Central Michigan University Faculty
Association v. Central Michigan
University
by Steven P. Howarth*
Collective bargaining in university faculty employment is an in-
creasingly controversial aspect of modem labor relations.' It brings
public employment's rapid transition toward an industrial approach to
labor dispute resolution 2 into conffict with higher education's rich his-
tory of autonomy in academic policy formation.3 These adverse forces
* B.S., 1978, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo. Member, Sec-
ond Year Class.
I. Faculty collective bargaining is essentially a phenomenon of the 1970's. Most of
the state faculty employment relations statutes were enacted in the early years of the decade.
Since the enactment of these statutes and the litigation which has ensued interpreting these
statutes, commentators have actively debated issues presented by the subject of faculty col-
lective bargaining, including the proper scope of the bargaining obligation. See, e.g., K.
MORTIMER, FACULTY BARGAINING, STATE GOVERNMENT, AND CAMPUS AUTONOMY: THE
EXPERIENCE IN EIGHT STATES (1976); Hankin, The Strategy and Tactics of Collective Bar-
gaining, in COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 13 (M. Brick ed. 1973);
Wollett, Issues at Stake, in FACULTY UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 20 (E. Duryea
& R. Fisk eds. 1973); Bowles, Dqining the Scope ofBargainingfor Teacher Negotiations: A
Study of Judicial Approaches, 29 LAB. L.J. 649 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Bowles]; Brown,
Collective Bargaining in Higher Education, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1067 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Brown]; DuPont & Tobin, Teacher Negotiations into the Seventies, 12 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 711 (1971); Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MICH. L.
REV. 885 (1973); Hogler, Collective Bargaining in Education and the Student, 27 LAB. L.J.
712, (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hogler]; Menard, Exploding Representation Areas. Colleges
and Universities, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 931 (1976). The courts have similarly
divided in their approaches to interpreting the bargaining obligation. See notes 8 & 36 infra.
2. See S. MOSES, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 31
(1973).
3. See note 14 infra for a general discussion of the historical independence of Michi-
gan higher education from legislative control in policymaking decisions. See also Board of
Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978), where the United States Supreme
Court, in denying Horowitz' demand for a quasi-judicial hearing prior to her dismissal from
medical school, held the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment did not require
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frequently collide when the judiciary categorizes negotiation topics as
either mandatory or non-mandatory for collective bargaining pur-
poses.4 The pressure to protect the employee rights of faculty members
by including all facets of their employment within the employer's bar-
gaining obligation is countered by the desire to maintain the histori-
cally collegial style of university governance in which segments of the
academic community work together to formulate educational policy.
Public employment is excluded from the terms of the National La-
bor Relations Act5 (NLRA); indeed, collective bargaining by university
faculty does not seem to have been contemplated when the NLRA or
its amendments were enacted.6 Consequently, public higher eduction
employment relations are controlled by state legislation.7 Not surpris-
ingly, the courts interpreting such legislation have developed contrast-
ing approaches in determining a university's duty to bargain. 8 Some
such a hearing. Id. at 86 n.3. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, stressed the inappro-
priateness ofjudicial procedures in academic dismissal decisions which necessarily are based
on the expertise and judgment of professional faculty and administrators. Id. at 90.
4. See note 37 infra for an explanation of the significance of categorizing a bargaining
topic as mandatory.
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
6. Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education. The Failure of Policymaking Through Ad-
judication, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 63, 84-85 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Kahn].
7. See notes 24-25 & accompanying text infra. Not all states in which public univer-
sity faculty are unionized have legislation authorizing faculty collective bargaining. For
example, governing boards in Arizona, Illinois, Maryland, and Ohio have promulgated ad-
ministrative policies enabling college and university faculties to bargain collectively. M.
GARFIN, DIRECTORY OF FACULTY CONTRACTS AND BARGAINING AGENTS IN INSTITUTIONS
OF HIGHER EDUCATION 37 (1979).
8. Categorizing judicial approaches to defining the scope of bargaining for public uni-
versities is a precarious task. One writer found four different bases for court decisions. He
called these theories Illegal Delegation, Impact Balancing, Labeling, and Public Policy.
Bowles, supra note I, at 656. Unfortunately, the lines of demarcation between his categories
are unclear and therefore these theories do not provide the best models for discussing bar-
gaining obligation holdings.
This Note divides the various courts which have defined the academic bargaining duty
into two groups. These groups are differentiated according to the interests considered by the
courts in making a scope determination. If a court primarily examines the interests of the
employees in categorizing a bargaining topic, that court will be considered one which ap-
plies the industrial model. The "industrial" label is used because this standard is most often
utilized in private sector labor dispute resolution. See text accompanying notes 29-32 infra.
If, on the other hand, the court weighs the concerns of the faculty with the interests of the
university as a public employer, the court is classified as using the balancing test. See text
accompanying notes 33-36 infra.
A number of cases illustrate this bifurcation of judicial doctrines. For instance, the
Nevada Supreme Court in Clark County School Dist. v. Local Gov't Employee-Manage-
ment Relations Bd., 90 Nev. 442, 530 P.2d 114 (1974), had a number of bargaining topics
before it and, after looking solely to the effect these topics had on faculty employment condi-
tions, held that all subjects significantly related to faculty employment, including wages,
hours, and working conditions, were mandatory for negotiation. In Aberdeen Educ. Ass'n v.
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state courts have adopted the federal or industrial approach which fo-
cuses primarily on the effect a bargaining topic has on faculty employ-
ment conditions; this approach most often results in an issue being
declared a mandatory topic of negotiation.9 Others have concluded
that the interest in effective academic policy is just as important as the
employment concerns of the faculty; these jurisdictions have adopted a
standard balancing the policy aspects against the employment aspects
of an academic decision to decide whether the decision should be a
mandatory bargaining subject. 10
In the 1978 decision in Central Michigan Universit Faculy Associ-
ation v. Central Michigan University"' (CMU), the Michigan Supreme
Court confronted a controversy over the public university's duty to bar-
gain. Unlike some states which have specific legislation concerning ac-
ademic employment,' 2 Michigan has only a general public labor
statute, the Public Employment Relations Act 13 (PERA), applicable to
all public employers, including, state universities.' 4 The PERA de-
Aberdeen Bd. of Educ., 88 S.D. 127, 215 N.W.2d 837 (1974), the Supreme Court of South
Dakota held that bargaining subjects which materially affect the faculty's working condi-
tions were mandatory for collective bargaining. The court based its decision on an applica-
tion of the standard existing under federal labor principles. Again, only the faculty interest
was considered in reaching this conclusion.
In contrast to the approach adopted by Nevada and South Dakota is the direction taken
in Connecticut, see West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Decourcey, 162 Conn. 566, 295 A.2d 526
(1972); Nebraska, see School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Seward, 188
Neb. 772, 199 N.W.2d 752 (1972); New Jersey, see Association of N.J. State Colleges
Faculty, Inc. v. Dungan, 64 N.J. 338, 316 A.2d 425 (1974); and Pennsylvania, see Penn-
sylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262
(1975). All of these courts refused to ignore the interest of the public employer in deciding
whether a specific employment topic was part of the school's bargaining obligation. They
weighed the relative impact of the subject on faculty employment and academic policy and
concluded that only those subjects which were primarily related to faculty working condi-
tions would be within the institutions' bargaining duty.
These two approaches have led to different conclusions regarding the mandatory status
of certain negotiation topics. For example, the Nevada court held that because class size
bears a significant relation to employment, it must be a subject of bargaining. Clark County
School Dist. v. Local Gov't Employee-Management Relations Bd., 90 Nev. at 447-49, 530
P.2d at 118-119. The Nebraska court, however, ruled that class size was outside the bargain-
ing obligation because it was predominantly a matter of educational policy. School Dist. of
Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Seward, 188 Neb. at 784, 199 N.W.2d at 759.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in Barrington School Comm. v. Rhode Island State
Labor Bd., 388 A.2d 1369 (R.I. 1978), illustrated the judicial uncertainty created by the
faculty scope of bargaining issue. The court approached the question of the employer
school's bargaining duty by initially using language suggesting a balancing test, but finally
applied the industrial approach. .d. at 1373-74. The court, however, clearly stated in a
caveat that the decision did not set forth a general rule. Id. at 1374.
9. See note 8 suipra.
10. See note 8 suepra.
11. 404 Mich. 268, 273 N.W.2d 21 (1978).
12. See note 25 & accompanying text infra.
13. MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 423.201-.216 (1978 & Supp. 1979 & 1980).
14. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Employment Relations Comm'n, 389 Mich. 96,
204 N.W.2d 218 (1973); Board of Control of E. Mich. Univ. v. Labor Mediation Bd., 384
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scribes the employer's duty to bargain as an obligation to meet and
confer in good faith with respect to "wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment."' 15 The issue in CMU was whether a uni-
versity-adopted teaching effectiveness program, which included a sec-
tion requiring student evaluation of faculty performance, was part of
that bargaining duty.' 6
The Michigan Supreme Court, in a five-to-two decision, divided
on the question of the appropriate standard to implement in determin-
ing the university's duty to bargain. The majority, adopting the indus-
trial standard, stated that any subject which affected the faculty's status
as university employees was a mandatory subject for bargaining unless
the topic was clearly educational in nature. 17 In applying this test, the
teaching effectiveness program was deemed to be within the Univer-
sity's bargaining obligation.18 The dissent, on the other hand, empha-
sized that the program's academic policy significance should be
considered as well as its employment implications and argued for ap-
plication of the balancing test.' 9 It concluded that the teaching effec-
tiveness plan was outside the scope of bargaining. 20
Because (MU juxtaposes these two basic methods of resolving
public university scope questions, it is an excellent model for analyzing
and evaluating these contrasting approaches to faculty collective bar-
gaining. This Note examines the background of collective bargaining
Mich. 561, 184 N.W.2d 921 (1971). These two cases, both decided prior to CMU, concluded
that all institutions of public higher education were public employers covered by the PERA.
The Eastern Michigan University case affected those schools whose governing boards' au-
thority is granted by MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 6. Included are Central, Eastern, Northern, and
Western Michigan Universities. The University of Michigan decision covered schools whose
boards' authority comes from MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 5: the University of Michigan, Michi-
gan State University, and Wayne State University. In each instance the university argued
that the PERA did not apply to it because its governing board had the sole authority to
supervise the school's operations. Sections 5 and 6 give each board power to exercise gen-
eral supervision over the institution and give the power to direct and control expenditures of
the funds of the institution. MICH. CONST. art. 8, §§ 5, 6. See MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§§ 390.550-.554 (1976 & Supp. 1979 & 1980). The court concluded that the autonomy
sought by the universities for their labor relations was not required for them to perform their
constitutional function. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Employment Relations Comm'n,
389 Mich. at 106, 204 N.W.2d at 222-23; Board of Control of E. Mich. Univ. v. Labor Medi-
ation Bd., 384 Mich. at 567, 184 N.W.2d at 923. The court further noted that the PERA did
not contain any language which indicated public higher education was excluded from the
statute. If the legislature had intended to exempt state universities, the court reasoned it
could have clearly stated such an exemption. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Employment
Relations Comm'n, 389 Mich. at 110, 204 N.W.2d at 225; Board of Control of E. Mich.
Univ. v. Labor Mediation Bd., 384 Mich. at 566, 184 N.W.2d at 923.
15. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.215 (1978).
16. 404 Mich. at 276, 273 N.W.2d at 24.
17. Id. at 280-82, 273 N.W.2d at 26-27.
18. Id. at 282, 273 N.W.2d at 33.
19. Id. at 290-92, 273 N.W.2d at 31-32 (dissenting opinion).
20. Id. at 295, 273 N.W.2d at 33.
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in higher education by describing the classic bargaining obligation
principles formulated in the private sector. The Note then describes
CMU's factual setting and compares the two standards presented by
the CMU court. Finally, the Note analyzes the CMU holdings and
reaches two conclusions. First, the inflexibility of the majority ignores
the unique nature of university employment. Consequently, CMU
may cause the undesirable result of subjecting critical academic policy
matters to the bipartisan pressures of adversarial collective bargaining.
Second, a balancing test is the preferable method for resolving scope of
bargaining questions in public higher education because it recognizes
that certain topics, notwithstanding their effect upon faculty employ-
ment, should be insulated from traditional labor negotiations. Addi-
tionally, the balancing test safeguards the interests of other parties,
such as students and the public, affected by the decision. This balanc-
ing test enables courts to consider a multitude of crucial variables and
thus make scope determinations by weighing the factual circumstances
of each controversy.
Background of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education
Collective bargaining in public universities is completely outside
federal legislation. The NLRA21 governs only the private sector; public
employment is expressly excluded from its provisions.22 Many states,
however, have enacted legislation authorizing public collective bar-
gaining.23 Some jurisdictions exempt universities from their public em-
ployment statutes altogether,24 while others exclude state universities
from the general acts but set up legislation specifically governing aca-
demic employment.25 Most statutes express the statutory duty to bar-
gain in terms roughly paralleling that applicable in the private sector
21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976): "The term 'employer'. . . shall not include the United
States or. . . any State or political subdivision thereof ... " See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 223 (1977).
23. Thirty-two states have statutes authorizing collective bargaining for teachers.
Bowles, supra note 1, at 649.
24. Faculty at four-year universities are excluded from the public employment statutes
in Kansas, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. See M. GARFIN, DIRECTORY OF FACULTY
CONTRACTS AND AGENTS IN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 37 (1979).
25. See, e.g., Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 3560-3599 (West Supp. 1980). Prior to this statute's enactment, four-year university fac-
ulties were not able to exercise collective bargaining rights. For a discussion of California's
Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act, see Alleyne, Instituting Collective Bar-
gaining at California's Universities and Colleges: The Outlines of HEER24, 31 HASTINGS L.J.
563 (1980). Other states with legislation directed specifically to academic employment are
Delaware, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Rhode Island, and Vermont. See J. GARBARINO,
FACULTY BARGAINING 58-63 (1975).
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under the NLRA.26 Thus, public employers, including university ad-
ministrations, usually are required to negotiate in good faith over
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. ' 27 The
content and scope of these NLRA terms have been defined and devel-
oped by the United States Supreme Court, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB), and the federal courts in private sector cases.28
More recently, state courts have turned to this federal authority for gui-
dance in interpreting the similar terms found in their public employ-
ment statutes.
The critical element of the NLRA's bargaining obligation is found
in the language of "other terms and conditions of employment," a
phrase which often has proven elusive for the courts. The United
States Supreme Court, in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. i' NLRB,
29
construed this language and adopted a broad interpretation of the em-
ployer's duty to bargain. Apparently focusing on the statute's legisla-
tive purpose, the Court concluded that a wide scope of bargaining
would ensure that more labor disputes would be settled through negoti-
ation rather than violence. 30 The language of the opinion was vague, 3'
but lower federal courts relied upon it to develop a standard under
which subjects that materially or significantly affect the employee's
working conditions are mandatory topics of bargaining. 32 This stan-
26. Bowles, supra note 1, at 649-50.
27. This is the operative phrase of the NLRA's bargaining obligation. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) (1976).
28. See, e.g., Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of America Local No. I v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203
(1964); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); Keystone Steel
& Wire, Inc. v. NLRB, 606 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1979); American Oil Co. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d
184 (8th Cir. 1979); International Ladies' Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907
(D.C. 1972). See cases cited note 32 infra.
29. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
30. Id. at 211.
31. Chief Justice Warren's decision in Fibreboard did not expressly declare a standard
for determining the scope of bargaining. However, it suggested that any problem of vital
interest to both labor and management is mandatory for negotiation. This approach re-
flected the prevailing NLRB position that any matter related to wages, hours, or working
conditions which could be a "bone of contention" was compulsory. Weyerhauser Timber
Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 672, 676 (1949). Such a standard seems to place virtually no limit on the
scope of mandatory topics for collective bargaining.
Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, maintained that "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment" were words of limitation. 379 U.S. at 220. He felt
that management decisions at "the core of entrepreneurial control" or fundamental to the
basic direction of the enterprise were excluded from the bargaining duty. Id. at 223. This
standard, since termed the "materially affect" rule, results in a more limited scope of bar-
gaining than does the NLRB or Fibreboard majority test because it declares certain manage-
ment actions non-negotiable even though they may vitally interest labor.
32. See Axelson Inc., Subsidiary of U.S.A. Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 91 (5th Cir.
1979); Ford Motor Co. (Chicago Stamping Plant) v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1978);
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dard is here termed the industrial test.
The dilemma that state courts faced in academic employment
cases was how to interpret public employment statutes that have provi-
sions closely resembling the NLRA's bargaining obligation. Many
courts noted a distinction between conditions of employment and mat-
ters of educational policy, declaring that the former should be
mandatory for negotiation while the latter should be excluded.33 The
judiciary soon discovered, however, that the two terms were hardly an-
tithetical; in fact, most subjects were a mixture of both employment and
policy. Some courts thereafter turned to federal law, 34 reasoning that
the similarity between their states' public employment statutes and the
NLRA indicated a legislative intent that federal labor precedent be au-
thority for local labor actions. Accordingly, they held that only those
topics that have a material effect upon faculty employment are compul-
sory for negotiation.35 Other jurisdictions, citing the great differences
between private employment and public academic employment, have
refused to follow federal labor law, adopting instead a test which bal-
ances the impact of an academic decision upon faculty working condi-
tions against its importance to educational policy.36 This test tends to
Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1973); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 542 (4th Cir. 1967). See also Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of
America Local No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 179 (1971).
33. Some of the courts which have noted this dichotomy are Connecticut, see West
Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Decourcey, 162 Conn. 566, 295 A.2d 526 (1972); Nebraska, see
School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Seward, 188 Neb. 772, 199 N.W.2d
752 (1972); New Jersey, see Association of N.J. State Colleges Faculty, Inc. v. Dungan, 64
N.J. 338, 316 A.2d 425 (1974); Pennsylvania, see Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State
College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975); and Wisconsin, see City of
Beloit v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 73 Wis. 2d 43, 242 N.W.2d 231 (1976). See
generally 84 A.L.R.3d 242, 258-60 (1976).
34. The South Dakota Supreme Court, in Aberdeen Educ. Ass'n v. Aberdeen Bd. of
Educ., 88 S.D. 127, 215 N.W.2d 837 (1974), adopted the "materially affect" rule after exam-
ining various federal courts of appeals decisions, including Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
NLRB, 387 F.2d 542 (4th Cir. 1967).
35. The states which apply the industrial approach include Nevada, South Dakota, and
Rhode Island. See note 8 supra.
36. These states include Connecticut, Nebraska, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Wis-
consin. See note 33 supra. Also in this category are Alaska, see Kenai Peninsula Borough
School Dist. v. Kenai Peninsula Educ. Ass'n, 572 P.2d 416 (Alaska 1977); and Oregon, see
Sutherlin Educ. Ass'n v. Sutherlin School Dist. No. 130, 25 Or. App. 85, 548 P.2d 204 (1976).
The NLRB's treatment of private higher education merits attention also. Although there
was no express mention of the faculty-administration scenario in the NLRA or its amend-
ments, Kahn, supra note 6, at 85, private universities were not excluded from its terms. The
NLRB made its first definitive statement on this subject in 1951. The Board, in Trustees of
Columbia University, 97 N.L.R.B. 424 (1951), refused to assert jurisdiction over academic
institutions whose concerns were noncommercial and related to "charitable purposes and
educational activities." Id. at 427. This policy prevailed until Cornell University, 183
N.L.R.B. 329 (1970), in which the NLRB asserted jurisdiction because it found that the
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narrow the scope of bargaining, since a specific topic could materially
affect the faculty yet be so critical to academic policy that it would be
exempt from compulsory negotiation.
CMU Faculty Association v. CMU
In deciding C'MU, the Michigan Supreme Court was confronted
with two conflicting judicial trends. Prior Michigan court decisions
had formulated a general policy of following federal labor principles in
interpreting the PERA's bargaining obligation.37 The resulting expan-
sive definition of the mandatory scope of bargaining was justified by
the conclusion that public employees need more assertive protection of
their rights by the judiciary because they are statutorily denied the
strike weapon.38 On the other hand, the Michigan Employment Rela-
tions Commission (MERC) had not been applying the industrial bar-
school had a significant impact upon interstate commerce. Id. at 334. No post- Cornell cases
have presented the scope of bargaining controversy, but dicta in Syracuse University, 204
N.L.R.B. 641 (1973), reveals the Board's inclination on this issue. After recognizing the
distinctive nature of academic employment, the NLRB concluded that reliance on its private
labor rules was inappropriate for university employment relations. It noted that the pur-
poses of the NLRA and the interests of the academic community would not be served by
blind adherence to traditional collective bargaining principles. Id. at 643. Unfortunately,
the Board did not present an alternative approach.
37. The state supreme court, in Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 391
Mich. 44, 53, 214 N.W.2d 803, 807-08 (1974), stated that federal precedent would be ac-
corded great weight in decisions interpreting the PERA's provisions. It reasoned that this
was the legislature's intent, since the statute was virtually identical to the NLRA. Various
principles developed by the federal courts regarding the scope of bargaining have since been
adopted by the supreme court. For instance, in Pontiac Police Officers Ass'n v. City of
Pontiac, 397 Mich. 674, 246 N.W.2d 831 (1976), all bargaining topics were divided into three
categories: mandatory, permissive, and illegal. The court stated that "[miandatory subjects
of collective bargaining are those within the scope of 'wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment.' If either party poses a mandatory subject, both parties are obli-
gated to bargain about it in good faith. Permissive subjects of collective bargaining are those
which fall outside the scope of 'wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment,' and may be negotiated only if both parties agree. Illegal subjects are those which
even if negotiated will not be enforced because adoption would be violative of the law or the
policy of the NLRA." Id. at 679, 246 N.W.2d at 833. This division of topics into those
mandatory and those not mandatory was first made by the United States Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958). The Supreme
Court also has held that the failure to negotiate over mandatory subjects is a violation of the
NLRA, as is unilateral action by an employer to alter the conditions of employment under
negotiation. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962). The Michigan Supreme Court
adopted these latter two principles for PERA actions in Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City
of Detroit, 391 Mich. at 54-55, 214 N.W.2d at 808. See generally Note, Labor Law--Scope of
Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector-Teaching Effectiveness Program, 25 WAYNE L.
REV. 147 (1978).
38. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 61 Mich. App. 487, 491, 233 N.W.2d
49, 51 (1975). The statutory strike prohibition is found in MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 423.202 (1978).
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gaining duty in academic employment situations;39 indeed, MERC had
pioneered the use of the balancing test.40 Additionally, the state
supreme court itself had indicated special treatment was appropriate
for public university employment relations. Justice Swainson, writing
for the court in Regents of the University of Michigan v. Employment
Relations Commission,41 stated that the peculiar nature of academic
employment compels the exclusion of subjects which are "clearly
within the educational sphere"42 from the university's bargaining obli-
gation, language that seems to suggest a balancing of interests. 43 Thus,
Michigan law remained unsettled when the state supreme court heard
CMU, leaving the court free to adopt the industrial standard, the bal-
ancing test, or even an original approach to determining the univer-
sity's bargaining obligation.
CMU: The Facts 44
The controversy in CMU emerged from the implementation of a
teaching effectiveness program. This plan had been developed and ap-
proved by the Central Michigan University Academic Senate, and was
subsequently ratified by the University's Board of Trustees. The
39. See Westwood Community Schools, 7 M.E.R.C. Lab. Op. 313 (1972).
40. Clark, The Scope of the Duty to Bargain in Public Employment, in LABOR RELA-
TIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 92 (A. Knapp ed. 1976).
41. 389 Mich. 96, 204 N.W.2d 218 (1973).
42. Id. at 109, 204 N.W.2d at 224.
43. Justice Swainson found the particular subject at issue, compensation for the interns,
residents, and postdoctoral fellows of the university hospital, to be a mandatory bargaining
topic. Id. However, he noted that a different conclusion might be reached on subjects tradi-
tionally within the bargaining obligation of private sector employers. An example of a topic
which would be outside the scope of bargaining as a matter of educational policy, he hy-
pothesized, was the number of hours interns must work in pathology. Id. If the justice had
looked solely at the impact of the two subjects on employment, as the industrial test man-
dates, both would have been compulsory negotiating topics since each appears to materially
affect working conditions. Justice Swainson thus balanced the interests of the faculty with
the interest of the university in academic policymaking. Id.
44. The initial collective bargaining agreement between the Faculty Association and
Central Michigan University in 1969 was the first such labor pact at any single, four-year
university in the United States. Bucklew, State College: Central Michigan, in FACULTY
UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 156, 158 (E. Duryea & R. Fisk eds. 1973).
Furthermore, it was negotiated in the year prior to the Michigan Supreme Court's ruling
that public universities were subject to the PERA's mandates. Nevertheless, the scope of
bargaining issue did not reach the court until 1978, several years after other jurisdictions had
confronted the controversy. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court faced the issue in
1974. Association of N.J. State Colleges Faculty, Inc. v. Dungan, 64 N.J. 338, 316 A.2d 425
(1974). Indeed, the CMU dispute did not even arise until the second faculty-administration
employment agreement was about to expire. The labor pact operative in 1973 when the
CMLU controversy arose covered the period of May 21, 1971 to June 30, 1974. Thus, the
public university's bargaining obligation was not defined until seven years after negotiations
became compulsory.
May 1980]
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Faculty Association's objections were directed primarily at a provision
of the program which called for student participation in faculty per-
formance evaluations.45 Faculty ratings by students had not been re-
quired previously; the use of student appraisals had been left to the
discretion of the various departments. 46 The teaching effectiveness pro-
gram attempted to improve the quality of instruction at the University
by providing documented assessments of faculty effectiveness which
could be relied upon for departmental employment decisions and could
provide teaching evaluations for individual professors.
47
Litigation commenced with a charge by the Faculty Association
that the University had violated unfair labor practice provisions of the
PERA by unilaterally adopting the program.48 The faculty agent
maintained that the plan was a term or condition of employment and
therefore a mandatory subject for negotiation. The faculty did not
challenge the University's right to implement such a program, but did
object to the adoption of this scheme without prior negotiation. 49 The
University, in response, argued that its special constitutional status and
the academic policy aspects of the teaching effectiveness program
placed the program outside its bargaining obligation.5
0
The scope of bargaining controversy proved vexatious to both ju-
dicial and administrative systems; none of the tribunals which heard
the action reached a unanimous verdict.5 The administrative law
45. 404 Mich. at 288, 273 N.W.2d at 30 (dissenting opinion). The Faculty Association
argued that Part I of the teaching effectiveness program should have been negotiated, partic-
ularly section C of Part I which provided:
"a. Each academic department should establish not later than one year after the ap-
proval of this recommendation, a systematic program for (a) evaluating and (b) improving
teaching effectiveness of every member in the department.
"b. All faculty members of the department should participate in determining the in-
struments and procedures involved in the evaluation process.
"c. Students as well as departmental faculty should evaluate the faculty of said de-
partment.
"d. Information obtained about an individual faculty member should be made avail-
able to that individual faculty member and to those individuals having the responsibility of
making recommendations and/or decisions regarding reappointment, merit pay, tenure, and
promotion.
"e. Departmental recommendations for reappointment, promotion and tenure should
be accompanied by evidence of teaching effectiveness. This is not to limit the accompanying
evidence to data on teaching effectiveness." Id. at 287-88, 273 N.W.2d at 29.
46. Id. at 288, 273 N.W.2d at 33.
47. Id. at 293, 273 N.W.2d at 32.
48. "It shall be unlawful for a public employer or an officer or agent of a public em-
ployer ... to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of its public employees
.... MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.210(l)(e) (1978).
49. 404 Mich. at 288, 273 N.W.2d at 30 (dissenting opinion).
50. Central Michigan University, 11 M.E.R.C. Lab. Op. 95, 120 (1976) (administrative
law judge opinion).
51. MERC and the court of appeals both held two-to-one in dismissing the unfair labor
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judge who initially heard the unfair labor practice charge sustained the
Faculty Association's claim.52 He found that the University had vio-
lated the PERA and ordered rescission of the offending part of the pro-
gram. The University appealed to MERC, which struck down the
order and dismissed the charge.5 3 The action proceeded to the court of
appeals54 where MERC's decision was upheld.5 5 Finally, the Michigan
Supreme Court reviewed the case, reversed the lower court, and rein-
stated the original order.56
CMU: The Majority
The CMU majority divided the question of the University's bar-
gaining obligation into two parts. The court first examined whether the
teaching effectiveness program was a term or condition of employment
within the meaning of the PERA. Summarily holding that the program
was indeed within the PERA, the court then proceeded to analyze
whether the nature of public higher education altered the scope of bar-
gaining and thus excluded the otherwise mandatory topic from the ne-
gotiations. The court concluded that the nature of public higher
education did not warrant making an exception for the University.
In finding the program a term or condition of employment, Justice
Moody followed the Michigan trend toward adopting the approach of
the federal courts and thus broadly interpreted the statutory bargaining
obligation imposed by the PERA.5 7 Justice Moody cited an earlier
supreme court opinion that used private sector analogies to ascertain
what employment topics must be negotiated in public employment.5 8
The CMU majority found the teaching effectiveness program affected
faculty reappointment, retention, and promotion and therefore con-
cluded that the plan was a term or condition of employment.5 9
The majority opinion was directed primarily to the second issue of
whether the nature of higher education limited the scope of bargaining.
The University argued that its unique status as a constitutional entity
and the express statutory grant establishing its governing board as the
practice charge after applying the balancing test. 404 Mich. at 275, 273 N.W.2d at 24. The
supreme court, in a five-to-two decision, reversed the MERC and appellate court holdings.
52. Central Michigan University, I 1 M.E.R.C. Lab. Op. 95, 98 (1976).
53. Id. at 115.
54. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.216(e) (1978 & Supp. 1979 & 1980) and MICH.
CONST. art. 6, § 28, authorize the Michigan courts of appeals to review final orders of
MERC.
55. 75 Mich. App. 101, 254 N.W.2d 802 (1977).
56. 404 Mich. at 283, 273 N.W.2d at 27.
57. Id. at 277-78, 273 N.W.2d at 25.
58. Id. at 278, 273 N.W. 2d at 25 (citing Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit,
391 Mich. 44, 55, 214 N.W.2d 803, 808-09 (1974)).
59. Id. at 278, 273 N.W.2d at 25.
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sole authority to supervise the school's operations60 compelled the ex-
clusion of the teaching effectiveness program from its bargaining
duty.6' Alternatively, the University contended that the program was
predominantly a matter of educational policy and thus insulated from
mandatory faculty-administration negotiations.
62
The court quickly disposed of the University's first argument. Jus-
tice Moody wrote that the supreme court previously had ruled that the
PERA's bargaining obligation applied to all public employers, even
those whose authority derived from the state constitution.63 Justice
Moody reasoned that the legislative purpose of drafting the public em-
ployer's bargaining obligation under the PERA was focused solely on
those aspects of the employment relationship which affected employees.
Thus, the interests of public employers and their origin were irrelevant
to a determination of their bargaining obligation. 6
4
In support of its defense that the program's implementation was
primarily a matter of academic policy and thus shielded from negotia-
tion, the University contended that the Regents of the University of
Michigan v. Employment Relations Commission65 opinion created an
exception for those subjects that are predominantly matters of educa-
tional policy rather than conditions of employment.66 Justice Moody,
60. See note 14 supra.
61. 404 Mich. at 279, 273 N.W.2d at 25.
62. Id. at 281, 273 N.W.2d at 26.
63. Id. at 279, 273 N.W.2d at 26 (citing Pontiac Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Pontiac,
397 Mich. 674, 246 N.W.2d 831 (1976)). The court's reliance in CAMUon Pontiac may have
been misplaced. The nature of the University's constitutional status was different from that
of the City in Pontiac. The latter derives its authority from MICH. CONST. art. 7, § 22. Ac-
cording to this provision, a home rule city is empowered "to adopt resolutions and ordi-
nances relating to its municipal concerns, property, and government .... " This grant
appears analogous to the power of general supervision extended to university governing
boards. The acts of cities, however, are expressly subject to the constitution and laws of
Michigan. MICH. CONST. art. 7, § 22. They are prescribed from passing resolutions, ordi-
nances, or charter provisions which are contrary to state law. Such acts, while not necessar-
ily illegal, certainly are preempted by state legislation. In contrast, art. 8, § 6 has no
language making university policy subject to state law. The only limit on university policy is
to be found in Branum v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 5 Mich. App. 134, 138, 145 N.W.2d
860, 862 (1966), stating that universities may not use their constitutional independence to
frustrate clearly defined public policy outside the operations of the institution.
64. 404 Mich. at 280, 273 N.W.2d at 26. Justice Moody reasoned that if any exceptions
to the PERA were to be made, the legislature would have to make them for the courts would
not. 1d. at 280-81, 273 N.W.2d at 26 (quoting Pontiac Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Pon-
tiac, 397 Mich. 674, 684, 246 N.W.2d 831, 836 (1976)). Justice Moody's opinion in CMU
seems to adopt the policy announced in Rockwell v. Crestwood School Dist. Bd. of Educ.,
393 Mich. 616, 227 N.W.2d 736 (1975), that "sound and expeditious" resolution of labor
problems would more likely result from the "uniform treatment of all public employment
relations." Id. at 631, 227 N.W.2d at 742 (emphasis added).
65. 389 Mich. 96, 204 N.W.2d 218 (1973).
66. 404 Mich. at 281, 273 N.W.2d at 27. See notes 41-43 & accompanying text supra.
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however, interpreted Justice Swainson's "clearly within the educational
sphere" dicta to indicate that only subjects strictly academic in nature
were excluded from the institution's duty to bargain. Applying this
reasoning to the teaching effectiveness program, Justice Moody con-
cluded that the plan had some employment implications and therefore
it was not "clearly within the educational sphere" under the University
of Michigan exception. 67
The CMU majority is unequivocal: a university is not to be re-
garded as a unique public employer under the PERA unless it can
show that a given topic for bargaining is exclusively academic. Absent
such a showing, subjects that affect in any degree the faculty's employ-
ment status are terms or conditions of employment and therefore are
mandatory for collective bargaining. Because the University could not
demonstrate that its teaching effectiveness program was strictly educa-
tional, it was required to negotiate with the Faculty Association over
the implementation of the program.
CMU: The Dissent
Justice Coleman, writing the CMU dissent, addressed the scope of
bargaining question in a different manner than did the majority. In-
stead of dividing the inquiry into two parts, she framed it as a single
issue: was the teaching effectiveness program a term or condition of
employment which was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.
Justice Coleman approved the distinction adopted by the MERC that
matters of educational policy were not within the scope of bargaining
while conditions of employment were, but acknowledged that most
subjects had elements of both.68 She noted that two basic approaches,
the balancing test and the industrial standard, had been developed and
that MERC had been applying the former. After examining both
methods, the dissent chose the balancing test on the strength of two
factors. First, the test recognizes that both bargaining parties, not just
the faculty, have legitimate interests meriting judicial consideration.
Second, this method enables the court to engage in a case-by-case anal-
ysis when determining particular scope questions.69
Applying this standard, Justice Coleman found that the teaching
67. Id. at 282, 273 N.W.2d at 27. Justice Moody's test only limits the bargaining duty
of the university if the subject in dispute is strictly academic; this seems to be no limitation at
all, for very few educational decisions have absolutely no effect on faculty employment. The
CMU rule that all topics which have any effect on faculty employment are mandatory nego-
tiating subjects is broader than even the industrial approach which maintains that only ac-
tions which have a "material effect" on conditions of employment are mandatory for
collective bargaining.
68. Id. at 290, 273 N.W.2d at 31.
69. Id. at 292-93, 273 N.W.2d at 32.
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effectiveness program was a subject having both employment and edu-
cational characteristics. 70 The opinion then proceeded to examine the
relative impact of the teaching effectiveness program on both employ-
ment conditions and academic policy. The effect of the program on
faculty working conditions was minimal, particularly for those depart-
ments which previously had used student opinion surveys. Since the
program did not specify the weight to be accorded to student evalua-
tions, the faculty in each department was free to define the extent of
their impact.71 On the other hand, the policy significance of the plan
was substantial. The program was established to enhance the quality
of education at CMU. Improving methods of instruction was a critical
step toward attaining such a goal and student evaluations were merely
a means to that end. Students could offer a unique perspective of
teaching effectiveness and their input was therefore an appropriate part
of a plan designed to upgrade Central Michigan University as an insti-
tution of higher education. Accordingly, the dissent concluded the
teaching effectiveness program was outside the University's bargaining
obligation, since it weighed "heavily" upon academic policy and only
"peripherally" affected faculty employment. 72
Analysis
Consequences of the Industrial Approach
When applying the industrial approach, a court analyzes a poten-
tial bargaining topic solely in terms of the effect that topic has on one
side of the employment relationship: the interests of the employees.
The sole focus of examination is the extent of the topic's effect on con-
ditions of employment. This orientation results in a definite bias to-
ward a determination that a specific subject will be mandatory for
negotiation.73 This policy works well in private sector application
where the standard was developed. As Chief Justice Warren wrote in
Fibreboard, the intent of Congress in enacting the NLRA was to en-
courage labor peace by exposing labor disputes to the mediatory influ-
ence of negotiation.7 4 The industrial approach thus certainly furthers
the NLRA's legislative purpose, because under such a standard the en-
tire spectrum of "gray area" topics are compulsory bargaining subjects.
This test, however, loses its legitimacy in public university labor
relations because promoting labor peace is not the sole policy behind
70. Id. at 290, 273 N.W.2d at 31.
71. Id. at 294, 273 N.W.2d at 32.
72. Id. at 295, 273 N.W.2d at 33.
73. Clark, The Scope of the Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, in LABOR RELATIONS
LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 92 (A. Knapp ed. 1976).
74. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. at 211.
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public university employment statutes.75
Two factors distinguishing private sector employment relations
from those in higher education render industrial principles inappropri-
ate in the setting of a public college or university. The first is the fun-
damental difference between public and private employment
performance incentives and restrictions. The forces motivating the
public employer are distinct from those driving the private entrepre-
neur.76 Instead of pursuing personal gain, the public employer is
charged with a duty to the public, a specific mission assigned by the
legislative or executive branch of the government. Budgetary pressures
are different as well, since budgets tend to reflect legislative priorities
rather than the specific desires of the agency.77 Public employers, re-
moved from the profit motive, have less incentive to keep costs down.
At the same time, they are more restricted in their ability to pass in-
creased costs on to the public. Some courts have held the redistribution
of resources caused by bargaining is contrary to public policy and, con-
sequently, they tend to exclude from negotiation subjects which may
result in substantial budget shifts.78 The political nature of public lead-
ership creates pressures and limitations on public management not
often encountered in the private sector.79
The second factor distinguishing academic employment from pri-
vate sector employment is the collaboration traditionally found be-
tween faculty and administration in the formulation of educational
policy. The disparity between this collegial relationship and collective
bargaining is so great that it has been argued the two concepts are mu-
tually exclusive.80 The basic premise underlying collective bargaining
is the existence of a fundamental conflict of interest between labor and
management. This is not difficult to envision in the private sector
where wages and profits frequently are inversely related, all else being
equal.8 l The resulting adversarial relationship is the foundation of the
bargaining system; relative negotiating strength determines which side
75. See generally Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist.,
461 Pa. 494, 500, 337 A.2d 262, 267 (1975).
76. The United States Supreme Court noted these differences in Abood v. Detroit Bd.
of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 227-28 (1977).
77. See Hook, The Academic Mission and Collective Bargaining, in COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING IN HIGHER EDUCATION-THE DEVELOPING LAW 19 (J. Vladek & S. Vladek eds.
1975) [hereinafter cited as Hook].
78. See Bowles, supra note 1, at 650-51.
79. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 228 (1977).
80. See E. LADD & S. LIPSET, PROFESSORS, UNIONS, AND AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCA-
TION 87 (1973) [hereinafter cited as LADD & LIPsET]; Mintz, Faculty Collective Bargaining in
Higher Education" A Management Perspective, 3 J. OF L. & EDUC. 413, 423 (1974); Wollett,
Faculty Collective Bargaining in Higher Education: An Organizational Perspective, 3 J. OF L.
& EDUC. 425, 436 (1974).
81. Hook, supra note 77, at 19-20.
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will reap favorable contractual terms. The role of the employee repre-
sentative union has a distinctive character in the industrial setting, gen-
erally functioning as a service organization which seeks redress for its
individual members' grievances, and is not usually active in setting per-
formance standards. Moreover, the union typically is result oriented,
measuring its success by the attainment of short term gains for its mem-
bers.82
In sharp contrast to the adversarial nature of collective bargaining
is the collegial system of governance prevalent at most universities.
Segments of the academic community participate in educational policy
formation and decisionmaking. Although professors are employees of
the university, they perform, by their representation in academic sen-
ates, many functions customarily considered managerial. 83 This seems
appropriate since professors view themselves as professionals with a
"moral co-responsibility" for the academic mission of higher educa-
tion.84 Responsibility for the educational affairs of the institution fre-
quently is decentralized in the faculty departments and individual
faculty members generally enjoy a degree of autonomy not found
among private sector employees.85 Instead of being in conflict with the
administration, the faculty shares the administration's goal of enhanc-
ing the quality of the institution.86
The interests of other members of the academic community also
are important. As the initial beneficiaries of the educational system,
students have a great incentive to contribute to the academic decision-
making process. Student participation is important, both as a symbol
of institutional identity and as a means of communicating with the
faculty and the administration. 7 The public is concerned with the
quality of higher education and the maintenance of societal values, as
well as with the effective utilization of tax dollars. Although the citi-
zenry's contribution usually is limited to electing university governing
boards88 or the public officials who appoint board members, civic
82. Edwards, LegalAspects of the Duty to Bargain, in FACULTY BARGAINING IN THE
SEVENTIES (T. Tice ed. 1973).
83. See note 93 infra.
84. Hook, supra note 77, at 20.
85. Edwards, Legal Aspects of the Duty to Bargain, in FACULTY BARGAINING IN THE
SEVENTIES 34 (T. Tice ed. 1973).
86. See Kahn, supra note 6, at 68. "Furthermore, in higher education there is no sharp
dividing line between the employer and employees. The university is, ideally, a professional
community in which common educational interests supersede all potential divisions between
the faculty and the administration. The university's unique set of goals (education, research,
and service) is achieved only by a series of specialist communities working together through
their common concern for enlarging and applying their own spheres of knowledge." Id.
87. T. TICE, CAMPUS EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 268 (1976).
88. In Michigan, for instance, the governing boards of the University of Michigan,
Michigan State University, and Wayne State University are elected by the public. MICH.
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groups may become particularly involved in the implementation of
specific education programs.8 9 Finally, university governing boards are
concerned with carrying out public legislative directives. 90
Governance at Central Michigan University exemplifies the tradi-
tion of shared authority and collegiality. The catalyst for policy formu-
lation at the University is its academic senate.91 With a tripartite
composition of faculty members, administrators, and student represent-
atives, 92 the Senate considers within its purview any matter relevant to
the general welfare of the faculty or the academic affairs of the institu-
tion.93 Its actions are subject to the approval of the University's presi-
dent and the Board of Trustees, but testimony in CMU indicated that
ratification of the Senate's teaching effectiveness plan was not required
to make it part of university policy.94
The variety of competing considerations demonstrated in the fac-
tual setting of CMU, including the protection of the collegial style of
university governance, the notion that sound public policy is not likely
to result from pressured employment negotiations, and the interests of
parties other than labor and management in the outcome of faculty-
administration bargaining, are not addressed by the industrial ap-
proach. Consequently, its application may have an undesirable impact
on public higher education. This impact, which is likely to alter the
present decisionmaking process within the university community,
forms the basis- for the central criticism of the industrial test.
The current collaborative relationship between the faculty and the
university administration is likely to suffer in the transition from col-
legiality to collective bargaining. Educational policies typically are
formed in an atmosphere of cooperation where all parties work toward
CONST. aft. 8, § 5. The members of Central, Eastern, Northern, and Western Michigan
Universities are appointed by the governor. Id. § 6.
89. See C. CHENG, ALTERING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN
EDUCATIONAL DECISION MAKING (1976).
90. See generally Central Mich. Univ. Faculty Ass'n v. Central Mich. Univ., 404 Mich.
at 299, 273 N.W.2d at 34 (dissenting opinion).
91. Id. at 286, 273 N.W.2d at 28. The CMU dissent called the Academic Senate the
"principle academic (or educational) policy-making body of the University." Id.
92. The senate had 41 faculty members, 15 administrators, and 6 student representa-
tives. The students were chosen by the student senate, and the administrators included the
university's president, vice president, and all of the deans. Id. at 285, 273 N.W.2d at 28.
93. Central Michigan University, 11 M.E.R.C. Lab. Op. 95, 119 (1976) (administrative
law judge opinion). The academic senate's constitution outlined its various functions, in-
cluding deliberating and legislating "upon matters of concern to the Faculty, involving stu-
dents, staff, instruction, financial planning, University planning and organization when
related to academic affairs, . . . standards for appointment, promotion, tenure, dismissal of
faculty members; programs of faculty welfare ... ; standards for admission of students,
degree requirements, . .. curriculum,. . .student rights, and procedures for faculty partici-
pation in the selection of administration, and financial policies." Id.
94. 404 Mich. at 286, 273 N.W.2d at 29 (dissenting opinion).
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a common goal. Collective bargaining, in contrast, depends upon an
adversarial interchange and the pursuit of self-interest. Injecting this
competitive system into academic employment is likely to lead to a
breakdown of the historically synergetic policy formation process.
95
Faculty could lose their voice in policy issues which have no apprecia-
ble effect on employment but customarily are subject to faculty consul-
tation. 96 These are decisions traditionally within managerial
prerogative, thus courts following the industrial approach would not
compel bargaining over them. If the administration chose not to dis-
cuss them, the faculty could not force negotiation. 97 Conversely, bar-
gaining may be required over topics which only peripherally touch
faculty employment and are better achieved by administration action.
98
A move toward the industrial approach to collective bargaining is
a move toward bilateral agreements and away from multiparty partici-
pation in decisionmaking. Such a prospect has alarmed a few courts,
which have reasoned that the policy formed in the bilateral labor con-
tract will reflect narrow faculty priorities rather than broad matters of
public interest. 99 For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court thought
that formation of appropriate policy requires more than the input of
labor and management. 00 The Alaska Supreme Court voiced the fear
that successive labor agreements, forcing policy control away from the
university governing boards and toward the faculty unions, conceiva-
bly could lead to the erosion of board authority. This erosion could
threaten the political process, since the loss of board control would re-
strain the ability of elected and appointed officials to perform their
function as public servants.' 01
Inevitably, since the industrial approach rarely allows the policy
95. Tice, Pros and Cons of Collective Bargaining, in FACULTY POWER: COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING ON CAMPUS 129, 131 (1972).
96. Id. Examples of these policy issues are appointment and hiring of new faculty,
selection of new administrators, budgets, and resource allocation.
97. Some commentators do not believe that this is a negative result of the shift to in-
dustrial styled bargaining. They argue that the faculty, under the current form of university
governance, is diverted from its primary task of teaching by the necessity of performing
administrative duties. See LADD & LiPsET, supra note 80, at 85-86; Finkin, Faculty Collec-
tive Bargaining in Higher Education.- An Independent Perspective 3 J. OF L. & EDUC. 439, 440
(1974).
98. Tice, Pros and Cons of Collective Bargaining, in FACULTY POWER: COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING ON THE CAMPUS 129, 131 (1972). This result appears likely under the CMU
majority's definition of the university's bargaining obligation. Both sides may be more pro-
tected with the industrial approach, since the topic must at least "materially affect" the
faculty's working conditions to be mandatory for negotiation.
99. See 404 Mich. at 298, 273 N.W.2d at 34 (dissenting opinion).
100. City of Beloit v. Wisconsin Employment Labor Relations Bd., 73 Wis. 2d 43, 55,
242 N.W.2d 231, 235 (1976).
101. Kenai Peninsula Borough School Dist. v. Kenai Peninsula Educ. Ass'n, 572 P.2d
416, 419 (Alaska 1977).
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content of a topic to exempt it from negotiation, issues of vital aca-
demic policy significance will be exposed to the pressures of collective
bargaining. Activities that primarily affect policy could have the same
mandatory status as those that affect only employment conditions.
Compromises are certain to occur, perhaps leading to socially unac-
ceptable results. For example, the administration may make conces-
sions about student admission standards in exchange for the faculty's
acceptance of a lesser pay increase.' 02 Legislative concern over this
consequence of university labor relations may have inspired the statu-
tory itemization of bargaining topics found in some public higher edu-
cation employment relations acts.'0 3
By ignoring the university's interest in structuring academic pol-
icy, the industrial standard disregards the impact of faculty-administra-
tion negotiations on other segments of the academic community.
Students would be particularly affected by a shift to bilateral collective
bargaining: they are generally the first group to be affected by changes
in academic policy. In recent years students have become more active
in the formation of those policies through their representation in aca-
demic senates." °4 The advent of the industrial bargaining obligation,
however, signals changes in decisionmaking procedures whereby some
of the choices formerly made in the academic senate will be decided in
faculty-administration negotiations, thus excluding students from the
decisionmaking process. Students may conclude that faculty collective
bargaining will lead to interrupted studies and increased tuition,'0 5
a feeling which could heighten student-faculty tensions.'0 6 In recogni-
tion of the student interest, a few states have enacted legislation en-
abling student representatives to observe or participate in faculty
negotiations.107
102. Since the only factor considered by the industrial test is effect on faculty employ-
ment conditions, many commentators feel that the progression from salary as a bargaining
topic to curricular policy and admission standards is natural, if not inevitable. The faculty,
at least at institutions with active academic senates, such as in CMfU, is accustomed to par-
ticipating in these decisions. See Hogler, supra note 1, at 714. See also Brown, supra note 1,
at 1075-76.
103. See NEv. Rav. STAT. § 288.150 (1975). The statute sets out the permissible bar-
gaining topics. Included are salaries, sick leave, vacation leave, holidays, insurance benefits,
and discharge procedures. See also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3562(q)-(r) (West Supp. 1980).
104. LADD & LiPSET, supra note 80, at 92.
105. Id. at 90-92.
106. Id. at 88-95. See also Hogler, supra note 1, at 720.
107. California and Oregon have enacted statutes giving students the right to at least
observe faculty-administration negotiations. Student representatives are entitled to have ac-
cess to all documents exchanged by labor and management, as well as the right to comment
upon any matter under consideration. To allay fears that bargaining confidences will be
jeopardized by student presence, the statutes require that the representatives observe the
same rules of confidentiality which apply to the employer and employee agent. CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 3597 (West Supp. 1980); OR. Rv. STAT. § 243.778 (1977).
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Academic senates also could be victimized by the shift to indus-
trial style bargaining' 0 Their continued effectiveness is endangered
by the prevailing principles regarding employee representation. Public
and private sector employees, to bargain collectively, are required to
elect an exclusive agent to represent them in negotiations with their
employer.109 The employer can negotiate with the employees only
through this agent. The academic senate cannot be the faculty repre-
sentative because administrators are included in its membership. The
administration could not adopt educational policy developed by the
senate without prior negotiation with the faculty union if the policy
affected employment conditions. The bargaining process is likely to
evolve into the only meaningful contact between the administration
and the union, rendering the academic senate unnecessary and impo-
tent. 110
Benefits of the Balancing Test
Balancing allows the courts to protect the interests of all those hav-
ing a stake in the outcome of educational policy formation. By deter-
mining the relative impact of an academic decision upon faculty
employment and educational policy, the court can designate the proper
forum for an issue's resolution. If it is primarily a question affecting
working conditions, such as salary or vacation time, the decision would
be a proper topic for collective bargaining. If, on the other hand, it is
predominantly a matter of policy, the court can categorize it as non-
mandatory and the subject likely would be considered in the academic
senate where the entire academic community would deliberate about
the proper action. Included in this category would be topics such as
class size and student contact hours. The balancing test thus enables
the faculty to continue participating in university governance and still
pursue their self-interest in such subjects as compensation and employ-
ment benefits."' By doing so, the test accommodates the conflicting
108. See Brown, supra note 1, at 1075-76; Finkin, Faculty Collective Bargaining in Higher
Education: An Independent Perspective, 3 J. OF L. & EDUC. 439, 439-40 (1974); Hogler, supra
note 1, at 715.
109. See R. CARR & D. VAN EYCK, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COMES TO THE CAMPUS
12-14 (1973).
110. Justice Coleman and others do not see the atrophy of academic senates as inevita-
ble. See J. GARBARINO, FACULTY BARGAINING 31-40 (1975); K. MORTIMER & T. MCCON-
NELL, SHARING AUTHORITY EFFECTIVELY 82-85 (1978). However, even Mortimer expresses
the feeling that academic senates exist at the sufference of the faculty union and that, if the
union decided to pursue a topic presently controlled by the senate, it probably would prevail
over the senate. Id.
11l. It has been suggested that a tradition based on separation of functions between the
senate and the bargaining agent eventually may develop. Bucklew, State College: Central
Michigan, in FACULTY UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 172-74 (E. Duryea & R.
Fisk eds. 1973). This is not to suggest that the separation of functions will be smooth. See
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pressures to extend collective bargaining while retaining academic flex-
ibility.
A case-by-case analysis is the logical method for courts to take in
deciding scope of bargaining questions. The courts should be free to
consider such factors as the current faculty-administration and faculty-
student relationships, as well as the history of the governance at the
particular institution. 112 These could be important determinants in the
decision to categorize a bargaining topic as compulsory. For instance,
if the academic policy and employment impact of a university action
were equal but the subject was customarily bargained over at the
school, the court might be inclined to hold that the topic was
mandatory for negotiation. On the other hand, if there was an active
academic senate and a weak tradition of collective bargaining at the
university, the court might rule that the topic is not mandatory and not
part of the university's bargaining obligation.
CMU ably demonstrates the impropriety of using the industrial
test in public higher education. A few of the potential consequences of
submitting the teaching effectiveness program to the collective bargain-
ing process are apparent. First, in an effort to save the plan, the Uni-
versity might offer to strike out the student participation provision,
since this was what the Faculty Association found particularly offen-
sive.113 Second, any significant program changes arising from the bar-
gaining process could undo the three years of committee and depart-
ment work spent in developing the plan; in effect, the faculty would be
expunging its own efforts. Third, student contributions in the decision
to implement the plan would be eliminated because there is no student
voice at the faculty bargaining table. Finally, including the plan in the
formal, multiyear pact could remove much of the department's flex-
ibility in implementing it. It could lose its viability as a workable plan
for improving the quality of instruction at the university.
Conclusion
The scope of bargaining rule from CMU should not be difficult for
Michigan courts to apply. The state supreme court did little more than
extend the industrial approach to the bargaining duty of state universi-
ties, thus making their bargaining obligation indistinguishable from
also Hankin, The Strategy and Tactics of Collective Bargaining, in COLLECTIVE NEGOTIA-
TIONS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 13 (M. Brick ed. 1973).
112. See Central Mich. Univ. Faculty Ass'n v. Central Mich. Univ., 404 Mich. at 299-
300, 273 N.W.2d at 35 (dissenting opinion).
113. This is only one of the possible compromises. The Faculty Association could use
the program to gain bargaining leverage for other issues, and the plan could be altered for
reasons quite unrelated to its merits.
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that imposed on other Michigan public employers. 114 The long term
cost of convenience, however, may be great. The effectiveness of the
academic senate as a vehicle for multi-interest participation in policy
may be jeopardized. Students make be locked out of educational deci-
sionmaking. The faculty-administration relationship is likely to be
transformed from collegial to adversarial. Most significant, however, is
that critical academic policy issues could be subjected to the pressures
and compromises inherent in the industrial tradition of collective bar-
gaining.
The Michigan Supreme Court's decision in CMfU appears to ex-
pand the bargaining obligation of public universities to an unprece-
dented and unwise degree. Hopefully it will not be followed by states
which are presented with their own initial scope of bargaining contro-
versy. Unfortunately, the impact of CMU on Michigan higher educa-
tion cannot be so summarily dismissed. The state legislature may have
to intervene. Perhaps its solution will be to designate specific employ-
ment subjects which can be negotiated. It may feel compelled to give
the right to participate in university collective bargaining to parties
other than faculty and administration. While these measures may be
drastic, realization of the predicted effects of the CMU rule could make
them unavoidable.
114. 404 Mich. at 291 n.5, 273 N.W.2d at 31 (dissenting opinion).
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